Mary Douglas is generally regarded as a faithful disciple of Durkheim. Yet her classic work Purity and Danger is best understood as premised upon a fundamental disagreement with Durkheim, who she accused of conflating purity with the sacred and impurity with the profane . Key to this disagreement was the theoretical status of the busy scrubbings of everyday housework. This disagreement has had a substantial legacy since, in turning her attention to purity and impurity in their specificity, Douglas bequeathed anthropology and sociology a theory of purity and impurity that has remained an important, perhaps even dominant, paradigm. This paradigm has been identified as an exemplar of synchronic analysis. Yet this paradigm itself is the product of a specific historical and intellectual context, little recognised today. Attending to this context holds opens possibilities, which have otherwise tended to be neglected, for theorising purity and impurity in their specificity.
Introduction
Mary Douglas is rightfully taken to be in many ways faithful disciple of Durkheim (Fardon 1987) , and has described herself as such: As she expressed it in a radio interview , Douglas perceived that her problem has been to work with Durkheim's vision and to apply the most suggestive parts of his work towards a completion of his project Fardon
: . Yet this article will explore a foundational disagreement with Durkheim, which has been little noted by commentators who thereby misunderstand the premise of Douglas work Purity and Danger. As O Brien : has noted, the text is known for its famous dictum that dirt is matter out of place . Whilst this dictum is repeated ad nauseam... its underlying theoretical and analytical context is invariably ignored . Without awareness of this context, the decisive criticism of Durkheim staged by Douglas has been missed. Douglas proposal that impurity attends breaches in cherished classifications has often been characterised as an exemplar of synchronic anthropological theory (e.g. Maranda 1972); it is important to recognise, however, that this exemplar has its own history -attention to which can deepen and potentially alter its meaning.
For, though it has been recognised by a few commentators on her work (e.g.
Isenberg and Owen 1977), Douglas (1997) has expressed disappointment that the field has not generally recognised the stakes in her discovery of secular defilement, and attended to purity/impurity in their specific logic and social operation beyond their reduction to aspects of sacredness . Without attention to the inadequacy of Robertson
Smith s account of sacred phenomena, to which Durkheim, Franz Steiner and her own work were responding, she warned that scholars seriously risk missing the substance of what was going on in anthropology in the period in which her account of purity and impurity germinated (Douglas 1999a: 8) . Douglas was right to worry. As Riley (2005) and Lynch (2012) have observed, there remains today a tendency within, especially
Anglophone, Durkheimian thought to neglect secular defilement -and to a lesser extent impurity generally (despite the influence of Bataille and Hertz in some quarters). There even remains a tendency to read Douglas own work through this limited lens e.g.
Alexander 2006: 576). The article will begin by exploring the roots of Douglas s
research questions in a debate between Robertson Smith and Durkheim. Whereas
Robertson Smith had situated beliefs in ritual pollution as a mark of irrationality, Durkheim elevated impurity to equal theoretical status with impurity in his idea of the ambiguity of the sacred . Douglas argued against both theorists conclusions, whilst utilising a Durkheimian method. She highlighted the significance of secular defilement , missed by Durkheim in his subsumption of impurity into a face of the sacred. As such, her famous statement that dirt is matter out of place was not intended as the synchronic, totalising theory readers have often presumed. In fact, read in context this phrase is better understood as a provocation to the development of new reflections on purity and impurity in their specificity across domains of discourse and practice.
Impurity and anti-Semitism
Now to confront our opening question. Can there be any people who confound sacredness with uncleanness? Douglas, Purity and Danger ([1966] 2002: 196) .
Douglas arguments about purity and impurity in Purity and Danger can be seen as a move in a game to which we have forgotten the rules; these arguments are still intelligible, but do not yield their full meaning. Among commentators, Klawans (2011: 108) is among the few to have recognised the significance of this opening question, which indicates that Douglas s arguments in Purity and Danger were addressed against a very specific target: the long history of Protestant antiritualism', as evidenced especially but not exclusively in… William Robertson Smith . The first step in reclaiming this meaning is to identify more precisely the debate to which Purity and Danger began as an intervention. As Douglas ([1966 Douglas ([ ] 2002 There are two kinds of sacred things, one auspicious, the other inauspicious.
And not only is there no discontinuity between these the two forms, but the same object can pass from one to the other without changing its nature. Pure can be made impure, and vice versa. The possibility of these transmutations accounts for the ambiguity of the sacred. Yet the account of the ambiguity of the sacred was not prised or purchased from
Robertson Smith s text without retaining some remainder. For in practice, the notion of the sacred taken by Durkheim from Robertson Smith s account retained the latter s asymmetrical privileging of the pure as the primary nature of the sacred, and the impure as primarily associated with the profane. The primary role played by the sacred in his sociology, expressing and socially supporting society, tends to align it with the pure as the symbol of order and wholeness (cf. [1900a] 1992: 159) . In his first description of the impure as an aspect of the sacred, Durkheim defines it in part through its capacity to unleash every profanation of sacred things , implying that the sacred is conceptualised as associated with the pure ([1894 2002: 304) . More generally, when discussing the sacred, he tends to assign it the tacit property of purity, for example:
That an impure person may not approach sacred waters is a general principlewhether the impurity is moral or physical is not a distinction made by ancient religion
On a few occasions, Durkheim notes this tendency in his work to align the sacred with the pure and the profane with the impure emerging in his narration of the relationship between the sacred and society, and re-asserts the duality of purity and impurity as equal aspects (e.g. [1906] 1953: 36; [1912] 2001: 315-6 ). Yet the sacred must almost always be pure since, for Durkheim, it ultimately sustains society. Durkheim s reification of the sacred and his conflation of the sacred with the pure worried both him and his colleague Hubert, though they did not want to raise this concern publically (see Martelli 1995; Pickering 2012). Mauss ([1930] 1998: 40) noted that rather than addressing the impure sacred, in the form of magic, in its specificity, Durkheim tried to deduce it sociologically from the notion of the sacred. We were never sure that he was right .
Mauss suggests that Durkheim s focus on social stability meant that the Durkheimian sacred tended to be conceptualised as pure as a symbol of the social order, and in line with the Christian alignment of sacredness and purity. It is therefore addressed -tacitly and, Mauss suggests, in an insufficiently reflective way -as if it were always pure. Mauss argues that this conceptual problem led to a neglect of impure forms of sacredness in Durkheim s thought, and to a tendency to further conflate the impure and the profane. Christianity could not get rid of impurity altogether, it could not wipe out uncleanness entirely. But it defined the boundaries of the sacred world after its own fashion. In this fresh definition impurity, uncleanness and guilt were driven outside the pale. Impure sacredness was thenceforward the business of the profane world (Bataille [1957 (Bataille [ ] 2007 In the mix of Enlightenment discourse and Protestant Christianity which characterised thinkers such as Robertson Smith, the rational idea is strongly linked to the celestial transcendence of the sacred, matter to diabolic impurity Bataille [1947 Bataille [ ] 1998 .
This supports the alignment of the sacred with the pure. Bataille highlights the significance of Robertson Smith, whose work represents no doubt the oldest… division of the sacred world into two opposing parts ; Bataille criticises Durkheim for the treatment of the internal duality of the sacred in his theory, which is limited to a recapitulation of Smith s data . Bataille concludes, pessimistically from the point of theory, that the slippage from the impure sacred to the profane associated with matter) cannot be avoided [ 47] 1998: 41). Though he documents that this shift occurred within history and specifically the history of Christianity and of Western
Reason, Bataille ([1973] 1989: 69) nonetheless treats as somewhat inevitable that within a dominant movement of reflective thought, the divine appears linked to purity, the profane to impurity . Though revised, the Durkheimian model of the ambiguity of the sacred retains its privilege for Bataille as the paradigm for thinking purity and impurity (see also Caillois [1950 Caillois [ ] 1959 . This position differs from that of Douglas, as we shall now see.
Secular defilement
Looking back in the preface to the 2002 edition of Purity and Danger ([1966] Dirt is any matter displaced , e.g. hair, crowning glory etc. and hair in the soup. But child putting spoon it has licked back in the veg. tureen and told off for being dirty .
Dirty is much wider ranger than just dirt , )): .
In the 2002 preface Douglas also emphasises that her interest in the topic of purity and impurity as facilitated by her interaction with her teacher-colleagues at Purity and Danger Douglas observes that it is widely supposed to be a mark of primitive religion to make no clear distinction between sanctity and uncleanness (ibid.). She contends that this assumption results in a circular logic. A primitive religion becomes defined as one that treats the sacred as capable of impure form. At the same time, the fact that it is only primitive religions which contradict anthropological/Protestant dogma is used to dismiss further investigation of the particular social operation of purity and impurity classifications. Looking back, Douglas (1999a: 12) remarks that the problem was that they disapproved of beliefs in defilement as unacceptably primitive, while they approved of the transmission of sacred power through blessings, while never troubling to work out why one was the lowest form of superstition , and the other was modern and a good .
When societies were observed which assigned religious significance to defilement, in Purity and Danger Douglas ([1966] 2002: 21) observed two strategies used by prior anthropologists for interpreting these practices whilst retaining the assumption that holiness and impurity rightfully distinct. A first is to regard practices in which uncleanness has religious significance as mere magical superstition ; she cites
Robertson Smith. The second strategy she mentions is the idea of the the ambivalence of the sacred . Yet she levels at Durkheim the criticism that his account leaves impure phenomena within the religious sphere, such as magic, rather neglected. However, more importantly, she argues that Durkheim s account renders the operation of pollution beliefs utterly invisible within secular discourses -including, for example, our own beliefs about hygiene. Interestingly, this was a problem which Levy-Bruhl had also started to recognise in his late notebooks, unpublished at the time Douglas was writing -though Douglas ([1968] 1975: 50) herself discerned trends in this direction already from his earlier writings. In his previous work Levy-Bruhl s argument had been that neither dirt nor contagion has for primitive men the same positive sense that they have for us ; by contrast, in his final writings he acknowledges that ) see more and more clearly that the distinction between the two sorts of experience cannot be maintained (1975: 186-8) . Similarly observing the difficulties caused for anthropology by a categorical division between modern hygiene and religious pollution discourses, Douglas ([1966 Douglas ([ ] 2002 states that these problems did not interest Durkheim. He However, perhaps the more significant move is that Douglas identifies and analyses the role of purity and impurity in a domain from which Durkheim s theory and with activities conducted regularly by individuals rather than collectively on special days of the calendar ([1900a] 1992: 55; [1912] 2001: 229 ). Yet Douglas states that themes of purity and impurity were made salient precisely in a profane and secular domain with every one of these characteristics: the efforts of her housework, which she recognised as full of symbolically-laden classifications of purity and defilement. Douglas (1999a: 19) later stated that she regarded the use of secular as well as religious examples of how pollution practices worked as a potentially liberating theoretical move with respect to contemporary anthropological understanding.
She recounts that her husband had a low tolerance for dirt in the home whereas ) am personally rather tolerant of disorder , making it a hot issue for conversation in the course of running their home ([1966] 2002: viii, 2 Since the old approach to taboo via religion and the idea of the sacred has been beset with confusion, the new approach should be through the idea of defilement in a secular
. Douglas therefore calls the first chapter following her literature review Secular Defilement , to highlight the inadequacy of the notion of the sacred as an account for diversity of themes of purity and impurity in everyday social practices. The significance that Douglas ([1966] 2002: 85) finds in the discursive activity that we enact as we push the (oover around, wipe grease off kitchen surfaces or squirt bleach into the toilet is a fundamental theoretical move. Considerations of purity and impurity after Douglas have often therefore begun with the topic of busy scrubbings e.g. Forde et al. :
, using housecleaning as an experience-near way into the topic rather than in awareness of the theoretical stakes within Durkheimian theory that led Douglas to highlight housekeeping as evidence of secular defilement.
Matter out of place
Douglas change to Durkheim s theory cross-cut the dichotomy between the sacred and the profane, and any division between religious and secular discourses. Yet Douglas retained the Durkheimian assumption that cherished symbols express and affirm the structure of society in its totality. She proposed that phenomena which contravened such classifications would be designated by society as impure:
Is this really the difference between ritual pollution and our ideas of dirt: are our ideas hygienic and theirs are symbolic? Not a bit of it: I am going to argue that our ideas of dirt also express symbolic systems and the difference between pollution behaviour in one part of the world and another is only a matter of detail... the old definition of dirt as matter out of place [is] a very suggestive approach. It implies two conditions: a set of ordered relations and a contravention of that order. Dirt, then, is never a unique, isolated event.
When there is dirt there is system. Dirt is the by-product of a systematic ordering and classification of matter, in so far as ordering involves rejecting inappropriate elements... It is a relative idea. Shoes are not dirty in themselves, but it is dirty to place them on the dining-table... In short, our pollution behaviour is the reaction which condemns any object or idea likely to confuse or contradict cherished classifications (Douglas 1966: 48) .
As Fardon (1999: 84) has noted, Purity and Danger presents a potentially bewildering richness of both constructive and critical arguments . One of the reasons for this is that Douglas seems rather aware that the old definition of dirt as matter out of place, whilst suggestive, does not always hold and cannot be the final word on the topic. Commenting on her attempt to make this qualification in Purity and Danger, Douglas (1999: 11) later came to admit it was often expressed ambiguously . Anttonen (2004: 113) , too, has observed that in some places in Purity and Danger there is there is a lack of conceptual precision regarding the relationship between the construct of purity and the ideas of the sacred or the holy .
Douglas attributes the phrase dirt is matter out of place to Lord Chesterton s 1852 remark at the Royal Agricultural Society that ) have heard it said that dirt is nothing but a thing in a wrong place ; proximally, however, Douglas reference comes from William James :
The Varieties of Religious Experience who in fact used the phrase matter out of place rather than in a wrong place , and who is quoted doing so on page 203 of Purity and Danger. The quote, however, cuts off with ellipses James insistence that this theory cannot be the whole story, and only applies under some circumstances. This would suggest that Douglas was aware, whether from James or from other sources, of the long-standing history of criticism of Chesterton s aphorism as a heuristic. To give but one example, in his Hellenism and Christianity (1921: 144) , E.R.
Bevan argued that the idea that dirt is Matter in the wrong place plainly cannot be sufficient since if the field of the disagreeable and the noxious extends in one direction beyond that of the polluting, it is equally true that we regard a good deal as dirt, which we could not show to be particularly noxious or painful. The two fields overlap, but they do not coincide. Whether from James, some awareness of this longer tradition of criticism, or from her own reasoning, no more than a few pages after proffering dirt is matter out of place as a theory of purity and impurity, Douglas goes on to identify that there are various provisions for dealing with ambiguous or anomalous events besides classifying them as impure ([1966] 2002: 39).
One provision mentioned by Douglas for dealing with anomalies and ambiguities without recourse to purity/impurity classifications is, simply, to reclassify the phenomenon to make it no longer ambiguous or anomalous. Another is to eliminate the phenomenon before any need to classify it as impure arises; where there are sufficient sanctions to eliminate the phenomenon or back in line, Douglas is adamant that purity and impurity discourses need not be employed, but will only appear when these sanctions require legitimating or bolstering (see Douglas 1980 ). Yet another case, mentioned elsewhere in the text, is that when matter has fully decomposed and lost even the ghost of identity, it no longer evokes a classification as impure ([1966] 2002: 197) . )n her article on Pollution , written shortly after Purity and Danger, Douglas ([1968] 1975: 56-7) specifies the significance of culture and epistemology in varying how and where purity and impurity classifications occur: our culture trains us to believe that anomalies are only due to a temporary inadequate formulation of general natural laws but that other ways of dividing up and evaluating reality are conceivable , and will impact upon how we perceive anything which seems to defy the apparently implicit categories of the universe . For instance, Douglas ([1968 Douglas ([ ] 1975 theory attending to purity and impurity in their specificity. In part because the stakes of Douglas argument have been missed, this possibility has not been explored to the extent that it can or should be. Since the conventional place to put discussions of purity and impurity, under the rubric of the sacred , risks flattening these themes, there has not been the robust containing framework which generally facilitates cumulative theoretical attention to a topic (see Zysman 2012) . As Douglas (1999: 12) Dirt is matter out of place undoubtedly identifies an important regularity.
Elsewhere colleagues and I have worked to respond to Douglas s call for work to refine this theory. Our method has been to interrogate secular themes of purity in greater depth. In this, we have worked in the space carved out by Purity and Danger for sustained analysis of purity/impurity, but departing markedly from the common strategy of subsequent theorists, who have tended to focus primary attention on impurity, and treat purity as merely the absence of impurity (e.g. Kristeva [1980] 1982;
Moore 2000). We have also worked to examine the specific content given to the idea of purity in hegemonic Western and global discourses on nationalism, femininity and childhood (Duschinsky & Lampitt 2012; Duschinsky 2013b; ) . We suggest that dirt is matter out of place in such discourses when place is conceptualised as qualitatively homogenous and corresponding to some pre-existing truth or essence. We have explored the history of such ideas in early and middle Platonism, in Christainity, and in later Western thought (Duschinsky & Robson 2013 ). Yet, like Douglas, we have also worked to explore purity in cross-cultural perspective. Whereas Douglas places emphasis on classificatory systems, we have explored the materiality of the image of purity as the reason for the family resemblances which can be discerned in its use between cultures. This approach was already implied in Douglas s language and metaphors, if not the dominant thread of her argument. For instance, we have examined the association between purity and whiteness, facilitated but not determined by the fact that the uniformity of whiteness can be used to signify qualitative homogeneity, its emptiness can be mobilised to signify a transparent correspondence between phenomena or forms of subjectivity and their originary state, and the immediate visibility of any mark suggests a fragile vulnerability which makes any deviation already of great magnitude Duschinsky & Brown ).
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